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Article 3

The New Illinois Death Penalty: Double
Constitutional Trouble
C'est le crime qui fait la honte, et non pas l'6chafaud.'
French legal maxim
In its monumental decision, Furman v. Georgia,2 the United States
Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, held that the imposition and the
execution of death sentences under the statutes of Georgia and Texas
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth3
and fourteenth 4 amendments. Because of the uncertainties associated
with the meaning of the Furman decision, capital punishment in the
United States rests, for the moment, in a state of constitutional limbo.
Opinions across the judicial spectrum run from speculation that the
death penalty is now unconstitutional per se to theories that the death
penalty may be constitutional if imposed in a less discretionary manner. Following the latter school of thought, many states have reinstated capital punishment under -the guise of new laws which purport
to conform with the Furman requirements. Among such states is Illinois, which enacted a new death penalty statute on November 8,
1973. 5 Until the Supreme Court sees fit to rule more definitively on
capital punishment, the constitutionality of this new statute is, at best,
a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless, some analysis of its provisions
in light of Furman can be made.
1. It is the offense which causes shame, and not the scaffold.
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted."

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

4. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947), the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that
the eighth amendment was applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), the
Supreme Court by reference clearly implied that the eighth amendment prohibition was
applicable to the states. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-82 (1910),
the proscription of cruel and unusual punishment was held to apply to judicial imposition of such punishment as well as legislative.
5. Ill. Pub. Act 78-921 (January 10, 1973).
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THE LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP OF THE NEW ILLINOIS STATUTE

The impact of Furman was to invalidate in one fell swoop the capital punishment laws of the District of Columbia and thirty-nine states,
including Illinois, as well as the capital punishment provisions of the
federal statutory structure.
Analytically, the decision invalidated
death sentences in seven types of sentencing situations: (1) where
the defendant was sentenced to death by a jury which had a choice
between death and prison confinement;7 (2) where the death penalty was mandatory unless the jury recommended mercy;8 (3) where
the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, unless the jury recommended death;9 (4) where the defendant was sentenced to death
by a judge following a plea of guilty; 10 (5) where the defendant
waived a jury trial, and was tried and sentenced by a judge; 1 (6)
where the jury could make a binding recommendation of death, but
a recommendation of mercy could be overridden by a judge;'" and
(7) where the jury could make a binding recommendation of mercy,
but a recommendation of death could be overridden by a judge.'"
In Moore v. Illinois,"4 the Supreme Court explicitly invalidated the
capital sentencing system in Illinois,' 5 a system which corresponded
to the last of the categories listed above. Pre-FurmanIllinois law un6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Those states not authorizing the death penalty by statute at the time of Furman were:
Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. at 340 n.79 (Marshall, J., concurring). California had abolished the death
penalty by judicial action. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1972).
It appears as though statutes requiring the imposition of the death
penalty for first-degree murder, for narrowly defined categories of murder, and for rape
were not affected by the Furman decision. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). For
a complete listing of mandatory death penalty statutes covering capital crimes other
than these, see Comment, Furman v. Georaia-DeathknellFor Capital Punishment?,
47 ST. JOHN'S L; REV. 107, 139-40 n.294 (1972).
7. Statement of L. Harold Levinson, Professor of Law, University of Florida (Appendix B), before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in Hearings on S. 1, S. 1400, and S. 1401
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 123-24 (1973).
The appendix
contains an analytical listing of memorandum decisions rendered by the United States
Supreme Court on June 29, 1972, on the basis of Furman, which was decided the same
day, vacating death sentences imposed by numerous state courts. The analysis was prepared by the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and was included
in the N.A.A.C.P.'s brief, as amicus curiae, filed in the Supreme Court of Florida,
April 1973, in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
8. Id. at 124.
9. Id. at 124-25.
10. Id. at 125.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
15. Id. at 800.
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der this system had recognized three capital offenses: murder, 16 aggravated kidnapping for ransom, 1 7 and treason. 18 In capital trials, if the
defendant chose to waive his right to have a jury,' 9 the trial judge,
upon a finding of guilt, was free to impose or not to impose the death
penalty at the post-trial sentencing hearing. 20 On the other hand, if
the defendant chose to exercise his right to have a jury, upon a finding
of guilt the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury so recommended and the judge concurred in that recommendation, this also
at the post-trial sentencing hearing. 2 ' While the sentencing hearing
provided for consideration of evidence in aggravation and mitigation,
no specific findings were required, either by the judge or the jury.2 2
Obviously, such a sentencing system, insofar as it risked a highly discretionary imposition of the death penalty, fell squarely within the
sights of the Furmandecision.
In response, the 1973 Illinois General Assembly passed two pieces
of legislation designed to meet the Furman mandate and fill the lacuna
left by Moore. The first bill, House Bill 20, required the trier of
fact to impose the death sentence upon a finding that the accused's
offense corresponded to at least one of the eight capital offense categories for which the bill provided.2 3 By contrast, the second bill,
House Bill 18, required a specially convocated three-judge panel to
impose sentence in capital cases, with its sentencing determination extending to eleven categories of capital offenses.24
Realizing that the procedural differences between the two bills were
irreconcilable, and believing that the latter bill was more likely to be
upheld by the United States Supreme Court, Governor Walker vetoed
House Bill 20.2 However, instead of signing House Bill 18, he chose
to exercise his amendatory veto power 26 and returned the bill to 2the
7
Illinois House of Representatives, with specific recommendations.
16.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (Supp. 1972).
17. Id. § 10-2(b)(1).
18. Id. § 30-1(c).
19. Id. § 103-6.
20. Id. § 1005-4-1.
21. Id. § 1005-5-3(b).
22. Id. § 1005-4-1(3).
23. H.B. 20, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973), sponsored by Rep. Roscoe D. Cunningham (R.-Lawrenceville).
24. H.B. 18, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973), sponsored by Rep. Henry J. Hyde
(R.-Park Ridge) and Rep. Joseph G. Sevcik (R.-Berwyn).

25.

Letter from Governor Daniel Walker to the Members of the Illinois House of

Representatives, September 12, 1973.
26. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e)

(1970). See exact wording of Illinois Constitution at note 40 supra.
27. Letter from Governor Daniel Walker to the Members of the Illinois House of

Representatives, September 12, 1973.
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These specific recommendations eventually won the acceptance of the
General Assembly, 'and the bill, with two last changes by the House

itself, was certified into law two months later.
Legislative History
Indeed, the bill which became the new Illinois death penalty statute
had survived a rather tortuous legislative experience. 28 House Bill
18 found its genesis in Witherspoon v. Illinois. 29 In that case, the
United States Supreme Court had held that the imposition of a death
sentence would be precluded if voir dire testimony indicated that the

jury which imposed or recommended the sentence was selected by
excluding veniremen for cause simply because they had general objections to capital punishment or because they expressed conscientious
or religious scruples against its use.8 0 The clear implication of Witherspoon was that a state may not promote the impaneling of a jury in
a capital trial which is predisposed toward imposition of the death pen-

alty,3' just as it may not, in a normal trial, promote the impaneling
of a jury which is predisposed toward conviction.82
To circumvent the Witherspoon problem and to comply with the
28. For a general history of both H.B. 18 and H.B. 20, see Note, 23 DE PAUL
L. REV. 517, 518-20 (1973).
29. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
30. Id. at 521-22. Illinois has had a statutory death penalty since 1840. H. MATTICK, THE UNEXAMINED

DEATH

23-24 (1966).

Juries in Illinois have had the discre-

tion to sentence a defendant to death or life imprisonment in murder cases since 1874.

Bedau, General Introduction [to Capital Punishment],

CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT

7, 31

(J. McCafferty ed. 1972). Imposition of the death penalty was not deemed to be
cruel, excessive, or unusual by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Chesnas, 325
Ill. 361, 366-70, 156 N.E. 372, 374-75 (1927) (death sentence upheld in spite of guilty
plea by defendant). The scope of a jury's discretion in capital cases was.interpreted
as quite wide. People v. Dukes, 12 Ill. 2d 334, 339, 146 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1957). A
jury was permitted to fix the defendant's penalty from a consideration of all the circumstances in the case before it, including the heinousness, atrocity, and cruelty of
the crime. People v. Sullivan, 345 Ill. 87, 95, 177 N.E. 733, 736 (1931). While a
separate determination of guilt and punishment was not deemed fundamental to due
process in capital trials, People v. Bemette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, 374, 197 N.E.2d 436, 445
(1964), once the legislature established the separate sentencing procedure, judicial discretion to set aside death sentences was given perhaps an even wider scope than jury
discretion to impose them. In years shortly preceding Furman, the Illinois Supreme
Court set aside death sentences where the defendant demonstrated good character and
lacked a criminal record, People v. Crews, 42 Ill. 2d 60, 65, 244 N.E.2d 593, 595
(1969), or where the defendant was an arrant alcoholic, People v. Walcher, 42 Il.
2d 159, 165-66, 246 N.E.2d 256, 260-61 (1969). Opinions handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court in the wake of Witherspoon indicated that Witherspoon was to
be interpreted narrowly. People v. Speck, 41 111. 2d 177, 208-15, 242 N.E.2d 208, 22528 (1968); People v. Moore, 42 Ill. 2d 73, 81-84, 246 N.E.2d 299, 304-06 (1969).
31. 391 U.S. at 521.
32. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947); cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the establishment
of a judicial system which remunerated lower court judges for their services in criminal
cases only in cases of conviction and not in cases of acquittal was violative of due
process.
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Furman mandate, the office of the Illinois Attorney General suggested
the use of a special type of bifurcated trial in capital cases. Under
such a system, the jury, if not waived by the defendant, would determine guilt, and a three-judge panel, including the trial judge, would
impose sentence.83 This idea was incorporated into legislation drafted
by the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission in 1972, which
had been requested to study possible ways by which discretion in capital trials might be minimized in the wake of Furman.3 4 Specifically,
the commission proposed to narrow the number of offenses punishable by death; divide capital trials into two parts: a guilt-finding proceeding and a sentencing proceeding; eliminate the jury from the sentencing proceeding and substitute for it a three-judge panel; make imposition of the death penalty mandatory upon a finding that the subject offense was a capital offense; and place upon the prosecution at
the sentencing proceeding the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant's offense was in fact a capital offense.3
Upon approval, the commission's proposal found the necessary legislative sponsorship 86 and was submitted to the Illinois General Assembly.3 7 In the course of legislative consideration in the General Assembly, the Senate amended the bill by increasing the number of offenses
punishable by death; providing for a two-step review of both the con33.

Interview with James B. Zagel, Chief of Criminal Justice Division, Office of

the Illinois Attorney General, in Chicago, January 31, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Zagel
interview]. Interestingly, Mr. Zagel had argued pro hac vice for one of the respondents
in Witherspoon.
34. The Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission is an organ of the Illinois
General Assembly which, at the request of the General Assembly, conducts investigations, including public hearings, on any matter upon which the General Assembly may
wish to legislate. At the time of its investigations on the reinstatement of capital punishment in Illinois, the commission acted under the direction of Charles Siragusa.
35. Interview with Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R.-Park Ridge) in Chicago, January 25,
1974 [hereinafter cited as Hyde interview]. The final legislation was largely the effort
of Roger C. Nauert, then the chief counsel for the Illinois Legislative Investigating
Commission. It should be noted, however, that the Criminal Judiciary Committee of
the Illinois House of Representatives conducted hearings on the bill after it had been
filed, at which hearings Mr. Nauert testified, among others. Unfortunately, no records
of those proceedings are available.
36. Representatives Hyde and Sevcik acted as joint sponsors of the bill.
37. The bill was filed with the clerk of the Illinois House of Representatives on
December 11, 1972, about a month before the opening session of the 78th General
Assembly, which was held on January 10, 1973. Because of its early filing, the bill
was assigned the rather low identifying number of eighteen. After hearings in the
House Criminal Judiciary Committee, it subsequently passed the House on April 10,
1973, by a vote of 110-44, with three representatives voting "present." House roll call
vote record sheet, H.B. 18, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly, April 10, 1973. The record sheet
indicates that party affiliation was not a determinative factor in the outcome of the
vote. Unfortunately, no written transcripts of House or Senate debates are available.
All proceedings in both houses, however, are recorded. It is safe to conjecture that
House debate on House Bill 18 centered on the efficacy of capital punishment as a
deterrent to crime, and not on the constitutionality of the bill vis-a-vis Furman. Hyde
interview, supra note 35.
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viction and the sentence on appeal; and determining the disposition
of individuals convicted under the bill's provisions should the bill itself
8
be later held unconstitutional.1
After passage of the amended version by both houses,39 the bill
was sent to Governor Walker for his signature. The Governor returned the bill to the General Assembly with his specific recommendations that the number of capital crimes be narrowed; the sentencing
judges be permitted to temper the mandatory death penalty by impos-

ing a lesser sentence if, in their estimation, there were "compelling
reasons" for doing so; and the execution of any individual sentenced

under the bill's provisions be precluded until a "final adjudication"
of its constitutionality.4" The House, while adopting the Governor's
recommendations, made two modifications for purposes of clarifying
the Governor's intent. First, it changed the Governor's temperance
recommendation to read "compelling reasons for mercy," as opposed
to merely "compelling reasons." Second, it changed the Governor's
final adjudication recommendation by adding a definition of final adjudication.4 With these changes included, House Bill 18 passed both
38. The amendment was offered by Sen. Philip J. Rock (D.-Chicago) on June 25.
The Senate sponsor of House Bill 18 was Sen. John J. Nimrod (R.-Skokie).
39. The bill passed the Senate on June 28 by a vote of 36-16. Senate roll call
vote record sheet, H.B. 18, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly, June 28, 1973. Again, it appears
that party affiliation was not a significant factor in the outcome of the vote. On June
30, the House concurred in the Senate amendment by a vote of 103-36.
House roll
call vote record sheet, H.B. 18, 78th I11. Gen. Assembly, as amended, June 30, 1973.
40. Letter from Governor Daniel Walker to the Members of the Illinois House of
Representatives, September 12, 1973. In Illinois, the governor is endowed with an
amendatory veto power:
The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommendations for
change to the house in which it originated. The bill shall be considered in
the same manner as a vetoed bill but the specific recommendations may be
accepted by a record vote of a majority of the members elected to each house.
Such bill shall be presented again to the Governor and if he certifies that
such acceptance conforms to his specific recommendations, the bill shall become law. If he does not so certify, he shall return it as a vetoed bill to
the house in which it originated.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e) (1970).
In this instance the bill, having originated in
the House, was returned to the House. Discussion between the Governor's staff and
the bill's House sponsors as to the implementation of these recommendations ensued.
The discussion concerned whether the legislature was compelled to follow the exact
formula of the Governor's recommendations and whether it could add clarifying provisions not inconsistent with the Governor's intentions to the bill. The answer to the
first question, after consideration, was resolved in the negative, and the answer to the
second question in the affirmative. Memorandum from Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R.-Park
Ridge) to Sen. John J. Nimrod (R.-Skokie) concerning legislative disposition of H.B.
18, October 1973. There was a feeling that any risk of constitutional violation was
nullified by the close cooperation between the legislature and the Governor's staff on
the subject of the clarifications. Memorandum from Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R.-Park
Ridge) to Sen. John J. Nimrod (R.-Skokie) concerning legislative disposition of H.B.
18, October 1973. For a fuller discusson of the Illinois Constitution's amendatory
veto, see Note, A Dilemma in Springfield: The Scope and Limitations of the Governor's Amendatory Veto Power in Illinois, 5 LOYOLA CHI. L.J. 394 (1974), in this edition.
41. Letter from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating
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the House4 2 and the Senate,"8 and on November 8, it was signed into
44
law.
Commission, to William Goldberg, Counsel to the Governor of Illinois, September 24,
1973.
42. House roll call vote record sheet, H.B. 18, 78th III, Gen. Assembly, as amended,
October 22, 1973. The vote was 129-37.
43. Senate roll call vote record sheet, H.B. 18, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly, as
amended, October 31, 1973. The vote was 41-2, with five members voting "present."
44. There was some concern that the Governor might refuse to certify the bill upon
implementation of his recommendations by the legislature. It was determined that
there was no constitutional requirement which would mandate that the Governor certify
a bill after it had been returned by the General Assembly, even though the General
Assembly's acceptance of the revised bill had clearly met the Governor's specific recommendations for change. Letter from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, to Sen. John J. Nimrod (R.-Skokie), November 20,
1973. The pertinent parts of H.B. 18, as signed into law, read as follows:
AN ACT to establish the penalty of capital punishment for specified categories of the crime of murder which the Act creates.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
(Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-lA)
Sec. 5-8-1A. Capital Punishment. In any case in which the defendant is
convicted of murder, the State shall seek imposition of the death penalty in
all cases where any of the following circumstances obtain:
(1)
the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the
course of performing his official duties; or
(2)
the murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility
of the Department of Corrections, or its successor agency, killed in the course
of performing his official duties, or was otherwise present in such institution
or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer
thereof; or
(3) such person has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals
under Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, or under any
law of the United States or of any State which is substantially identical to
Subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended,
regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or
of several related or unrelated acts; or
(4)
the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an
airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
(5)
the person committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement
or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in
return for committing the murder; or
(6)
the murdered individual was killed in the course of a robbery, rape,
aggravated kidnapping, arson or when death occurs following the commission
of indecent liberties with a child by a party to the crime;
where any of the above circumstances exist, following the conviction of
murder under Section 9-1 of the "Criminal Code of 1961," the trial judge
shall in all cases, before sentencing the defendant notify the chief judge of
the circuit to assign 3 circuit judges to the case, one of whom should be the
judge who presided over the defendant's trial if that judge is able to serve.
The 3 judge court shall then hear evidence on the foregoing circumstances
and if a majority of the judges of such court determines that any of the above
facts occurred, then the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless
a majority of the judges of such court determines that there are compelling
reasons for mercy and that the defendant should not be sentenced to death.
At the hearing, the State shall have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the facts requiring imposition of the death penalty.
If the 3 judge court does not find as provided in this Section, after a hearing, that the defendant committed a murder which is beyond all reasonable
doubt within one or more of the classifications set forth in this Section, the
defendant shall be sentenced under Section 5-5-3 of the Unified Code of Cor-
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Statutory Provisions
The new Illinois death penalty statute represents an attempt to
comply with the constitutional dictates of Furman by reducing the dis-

cretion which formerly permeated capital offense proceedings.

To la-

bel the new Illinois statute as a mandatory approach to capital punishment would be to ignore its mercy provision as well as the remaining
discretion pervasive at all levels of criminal proceedings. However,
the new statute is certainly more mandatory in its operation than its
invalidated counterpart. A summary of its basic features follows.
The new statute narrows the range of capital offenses to a num-

ber of specific instances of murder, including murder of a policeman,
fireman, or correctional officer in the course of his official duties; murder of a licensee or an invitee on correctional facility premises; murder by a person twice convicted of murder; murder committed during
the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; murder perpetrated by a hired killer; murder committed in the
course of a rape, robbery, aggravated kidnapping, or an arson; and
murder incident to the indecent molestation of a child.45
rections.
If the 3 judge court sentences the defendant to death and an appeal is taken
by the defendant, the appellate court shall consider the appeal in two separate
stages. In the first stage, the case shall be considered as are all other criminal appeals and the court shall determine whether there were errors occurring
at the trial of the case which require that the findings of the trial court be
reversed or modified. If the appellate court finds there were no errors justifying modification or reversal of the findings of the trial court, the appellate
court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the sentence
of death by the 3 judge court was the result of discrimination. If the appellate court, in the second stage of the appeal, finds any evidence that the sentence of death was the result of discrimination, the appellate court shall modify the sentence to life imprisonment.
In determining whether there is evidence of discrimination in sentencing
the defendant to death, the appellate court shall consider whether the death
sentence, considering both the crime and the defendant was disproportionate
or the result of discrimination based on race, creed, sex or economic status.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, any
person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for any indeterminate term with a minimum of not less than 14 years.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing provisions
of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the
United States or the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to imprisonment in
the penitentiary for any indeterminate term with a minimum of not less than
14 years.
No sentence of death imposed under this Section shall be executed unless
there has been a final adjudication that the sentence is constitutional. For
purposes of this Section, "final adjudication" means the completion of the ordinary appellate process in a single case and does not contemplate the exhaustion of all available remedies.
Ill. Pub. Act 78-921 (January 10, 1973).
45. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1A(1)-(6) (1973).
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The statute bifurcates the trial of any defendant in a capital proceeding into a guilt-finding hearing and a sentencing hearing. Guilt
is determined by the jury, unless the defendant waives his right to
have a jury trial. Sentence is imposed by a three-judge panel appointed by the chief judge of the circuit court, which panel is to 4 include,
6
if possible, the judge who presided over the guilt-finding hearing.
Upon a murder conviction at the guilt-finding hearing, the prosecution, if it wishes to pursue a death sentence, must move for a special
capital sentencing hearing. 7 Thereupon the trial judge, before imposing sentence, must notify the chief judge of the circuit court to
assign the three judges who are to preside over the special sentencing
hearing."8
The function of the three-judge panel at the hearing is to consider
evidence presented by both prosecution and defendant as to whether
the murder is one that is subsumed under any of the capital offense
categories defined by the statute. On this point, the prosecution must
prove its contention beyond a reasonable doubt.4 9 Imposition of the
death sentence is to be based upon the vote of the three-judge panel,
each member having one vote, with a simple majority sufficient to
impose such sentence"
Upon a determination by the three-judge panel that the murder is
one of a capital nature, the death sentence is mandatory. However,
such a determination notwithstanding, the three-judge panel may,
again by a simple majority vote, refrain from imposing the death sentence if in a specific case it feels there are "compelling reasons for
mercy." 51 The determination of the three-judge panel as to sentence
is to be made in writing and submitted to the trial judge, who then
enters the sentence accordingly. 2
In the event that the three-judge panel opts for imposition of the
death penalty, and the defendant appeals, the statute provides for a
special two-stage appellate review. In the first stage, the case is to
be considered as other criminal appeals, with a view toward finding
errors at trial which would warrant reversal or modification of the trial
46. Id. § 9-1(b); id. § 1005-8-lA.
47. There is a minority view that if the prosecution fails to move for such a hearing
and the trial judge feels that such a hearing is warranted, the trial judge may, in his
own discretion, so move. Telephone interview with Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel,

Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, February 22, 1974.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-lA (1973).
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.; id. § 9-1(b).
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court's findings on the issue of guilt. If no such errors are found, the
appellate court, in the second stage, is to determine whether the sentence imposed by the three-judge panel involved any discrimination on
the basis of race, creed, sex, or economic status. A finding of such discrimination at the sentencing hearing, given the offense and the defendant, modifies the sentence from death to life imprisonment.5 3
The execution of any defendant sentenced to death under the new
statute is to be stayed until a final adjudication of the statute's constitutionality. Final adjudication is deemed to mean completion of the
ordinary appellate process in a single case and not necessarily the exhaustion of all available remedies. 54 In the event the statute is invalidated on constitutional grounds, either by the United States Supreme
Court or the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant's sentence is to
be modified to imprisonment for at least fourteen years. 55
THE LEGISLATIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF

Furman

Furman v. Georgia,56 together with its companion cases, Jackson
v. Georgia57 and Branch v. Texas,58 brought to the constitutional fore
the issue of discrimination in capital trials. Furman, Jackson, and
Branch were all blacks. All three were sentenced to death by juries,
Furman for murder, Jackson and Branch for rape. 59 The facts in each
situation made their respective criminal acts particularly "ugly, vicious,
[and] reprehensible": 60 the shooting of a father of five through a
closed door, 61 a rape effected while the rapist held the pointed ends
of scissors at the victim's throat, 2 and a rape committed at the victim's home by physical force and threats.65
The gravamen of Furman was that any capital sentencing system
which gives free rein to discrimination against a defendant by reason
of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class is unconstitutional. 64 Indeed, at least one study previous to Furman had indicated
that application of the death penalty was unequal and that most of
53. Id. § 1005-8-lA.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969), rev'd, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
57. 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969).
58. 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
59. Note, The Remains of the Death Penalty: Furman v. Georgia, 22 DE PAUL L.
REv. 481, 481 n.2 (1972).
60. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 315 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 252 (Douglas, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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those executed were poor, young, and ignorant. 5 Another study had
shown that blacks were executed more often and had their death sen-

tences commuted less often than whites in similar situations.6"
Analytically, Furman was not so much one Supreme Court decision

as it was a group of decisions.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect

of the case was that only two members of the Court, Justices Brennan
and Marshall, concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits capital

punishment for all crimes and under all circumstances. In their majority opinions, both Justices Brennan and Marshall offered the persua65. Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas: 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELIN. 132,
141 (1969). The study of capital cases in Texas made the following observation:
Seventy-five of the 460 cases involved co-defendants, who, under Texas law,
were given separate trials. In several instances where a white and a Negro
were co-defendants, the white was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term
of years, and the Negro was given the death penalty.
Another ethnic disparity is found in the type of sentence imposed for rape.
The Negro convicted of rape is far more likely to get the death penalty than
a term sentence, whereas whites and Latins are far more likely to get a term
sentence than the death penalty.

Id.

66.

Wolfgang, Kelly, & Nolde, Executions and Communications in Pennsylvania,

THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA

464, 474 (H. Bedau ed. 1967). The study provided

the following statistical breakdown:
RACE OF THE OFFENDER BY FINAL DISPOSITION
Final
Negro
White
Total
Disposition
N
%
N
%
N
%
Executed
130
88.4
210
79.8
340
82.9
Commuted
17
11.6
53
20.2
70
17.1
Total
147
100.0
263
100.0
410
100.0
Id. These statistics concerned individuals on death row in Pennsylvania during the
years 1914-58. The authors of the study attempted an analysis of the higher rate of
execution among blacks:
Although there may be a host of factors other than race involved in this
frequency distribution, something more than chance has operated over the
years to produce this racial difference. On the basis of this study it is not
possible to indict the judicial and other public processes prior to the death
row as responsible for the association between Negroes and higher frequency
of executions; nor is it entirely correct to assume that from the time of their
appearance on death row Negroes are discriminated against by the Pardon
Board. Too many unknown or presently immeasurable factors prevent our
making definitive statements about the relationship. Nevertheless, some suspicion of racial discrimination can hardly be avoided. If such a relationship
had not appeared, this kind of suspicion could have been allayed; the existence of the relationship, although not "proving" differential bias by the Pardon Boards over the years since 1914, strongly suggests that such bias has
existed.

Id.
While there is no evidence comparable to that of the Pennsylvania study on a national level, there is evidence that 53.6% of the 3,849 individuals executed in the
United States during the period 1930-64 were non-white. H. MATrICK, THE UNEXAMINED DEATH 5 (1966).
In Illinois, during the years 1930-57, approximately 33.7%
of the 86 individuals executed were blacks. See Sellin, The Death Penalty: A Report
for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL
CODE, Appendix 6 & 8-9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
Likewise, during the more proximate pre-Furman period of 1945-58, thirteen persons were executed in Illinois, of

whom eight, or 61.5%, were non-white.
(1966).

H.

MATTICK, THE UNEXAMINED

DEATH

16
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sive rationale that capital punishment stood condemned by enlightened
7
public opinion.
While three other members of the majority, Justices Douglas,
Stewart and White, struck down death penalty laws as then applied
in most of the states, their opinions did not evince an intention to
abolish capital punishment as unconstitutional per se. Rather, these
three Justices concerned themselves with the discretion granted to the
judge and the jury under death penalty statutes then in effect. Justice
Douglas stressed the disproportionate imposition of the death penalty
on minorities. 6 Justice Stewart emphasized the great irrationality in
the imposition of the death penalty. 69 For Justice White, the infrequent execution of the death penalty was crucial.70 Both Justices
Stewart and White agreed that there was need for a more rational
sentencing system in capital cases.
If the four dissenters are added to the group composed of Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White, a core of seven Court members declining to invalidate capital punishment on a per se basis emerges. Any
legislative strategy to formulate a constitutionally acceptable death
penalty statute would attempt to persuade favorably at least five members of this core, assuming no change in present Court membership.
Furman v. Georgia was also one of the rare cases in the history
of the Supreme Court to have evoked nine separate opinions from the
Court's members. 71 The five separate opinions filed by the members
of the majority, opinions in which no one majority Justice joined another, evidenced a clear inability of the majority to arrive at a consensus regarding the exact rationale of its decision. Consequently, only a
per curiam opinion for the Court was tendered. On the other hand,
three of the dissenting Justices, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell,
67. 408 U.S. at 296-300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360-69 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
68. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 311-14 passim (White, J., concurring). In Illinois, empirical evidence
indicates that the frequency of execution before Furman was quite low. During the
years 1945-58, 1,045 Illinois defendants were convicted of capital offenses (1,022 for
murder). Of these, only thirteen were executed. Glaser, Survey Shows Death Sentence Rare and Haphazard in Illinois, John Howard Association (mimeo.), Chicago,
Illinois, February 1959, cited in H. MAmIcK, THE

UNEXAMINED

DEATH 16 (1966).

Accordingly, the chances were one in eighty-three during this period that an individual

convicted of a capital offense in Illinois would be executed. H. MATTICK, THE UNEXAMINED DEATH 16 (1966).
Thus, arguments pointing to the desuetude of the death

penalty before Furman find some support in Illinois. See text accompanying notes
170-72 supra.
71. The only recent example of this phenomenon is New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1970).
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and Justice Rehnquist, won concurrence in their opinions from all
four of the dissenters. Thus it is clear that the threads of the dissenting opinions reflected a more uniformly woven rationale than did the
threads of the majority opinions.
In general, the value of a Supreme Court decision as precedent
turns on a myriad of factors, including the force and clarity of its rationale, the degree of unanimity among its deciding members, and
its longevity and durability as authority. Given these factors, the fiveto-four per curiam decision in Furman v. Georgia, bereft of any clear
ratio decidendi, can never assume the same precedential position as,
for example, Marbury v. Madison7 1 or Gideon v. Wainwright.7 3 Nevertheless, the Furman decision is binding on its exact facts as to all
American courts, just as is in any other Supreme Court decision.7 4
In the absence of a consensus as to the rationale supporting the
decision in Furman, legislatures must analyze the individual concurring
and dissenting opinions of the Court's members in attempting to draft
a constitutionally acceptable statute. While legislatures need not accept any one opinion as binding upon them, they may use any of the
opinions as a guideline in their drafting efforts. Obviously, the decision, if nothing else, precludes them from developing statutes like
those invalidated by Furman and its progeny. 8
Furman's value depends to a great extent on the degree to which
each Justice, in the future, remains consistent with his own opinion
and with those in which he concurred. Indeed, while Justices are
not necessarily obliged to follow their concurring opinions, it is considered likely that each Justice will continue to adhere to those views
he has previously expressed. In sum, the opinions filed in Furman
constitute the best judicial weather vane by which future treatment
of capital punishment might be forecast. 8
It was Chief Justice Burger who, in his dissenting opinion, recognized the equivocal nature of the Furman ruling as precedent and reproved the majority for its per curiam disposition of the case, intimating that the majority was in dereliction of its duty to articulate
72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
73.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

74.

Letter from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, United States

Department of Justice, to G. Robert Blakely, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in Hearings S. 1, S. 1400, and S. 1401 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at

60 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Dixon letter].
75.

Id. at 60-61.

76.

Id. at 61.
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definitive guidelines on basic constitutional questions. 7 7 It was also the
Chief Justice who threw down the gauntlet to the state legislatures
and to Congress for a return to the legislative blackboard7 and indeed
Specifically, the
an entire reassessment of capital punishment.79
Burger opinion has been construed to delimit three possible legislative
approaches to reinstatement of the death penalty: (1) mandatory
sentences, requiring imposition of the death penalty as an automatic
consequence of conviction of the offense; (2) discretionary standards, providing criteria for the discretionary imposition of the penalty;
or (3) a combination of these approaches. 80
Legislative implementation of any of these three approaches embodies an implicit belief that at least one of the "swing" Justices,
either Justices Stewart, White, or Douglas, will be persuaded to support a less discretionary death penalty statute and that the four dissenters in Furman will not deviate from their previous positions. Thi3
belief perhaps assumes too much.
First, Justice Douglas' opinion in Furman points up a singular precedential difficulty. He indicated that the constitutional infirmity of the
death penalty lay not in the death penalty itself but in the arbitrariness
of the sentencing system; s ' yet he considered the sentencing system
to be locked into its arbitrary status by virtue of stare decisis, s2 adverting specifically to McGautha v. California.3 McGautha had held that
a standardless sentencing proceeding at which a jury, in its full and
unguided discretion, might choose to impose or not to impose the
death penalty was not unduly arbitrary and was not violative of the
Constitution. 4 Given the quandary of a capital sentencing system
proclaimed as arbitrary by Furman set against an inability to effect
its removal because of McGautha's binding precedent, Justice Douglas
77.

408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

78. Id. at 400.
79. Id. at 403.
80. Statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, United States
Department of Justice, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in Hearings on S. 1, S. 1400,
and S. 1401 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 43 (1973) [herein-

after referred to as Dixon statement].
81. 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
83. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). As Justice Douglas tellingly phrased the problem, "We
are now imprisoned in the McGautha holding." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
248 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). However, it should be noted that Justice Douglas is no advocate of unremitting devotion to stare decisis. Almost a quarter century
ago, he stated, "So far as constitutional law is concerned stare decisis must give way

before the dynamic component of history.... ".Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 735, 737 (1949).

84.
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would seemingly have difficulty upholding a new, less discretionary sentencing system unless McGautha were explicitly overruled, something
the Furman majority did in effect but not in fact.
Second, some or all of the Justices who dissented in Furman may
change their votes in future death penalty cases in conformance with
the precedent established in Furman, even though that precedent is
weak. That is, some or all of the dissenters may choose to disregard
their previous predilection toward judicial restraint and their deference
to the legislative prerogative anent the death penalty, and may reach
the constitutional issue on its merits.8" However, there is no indication
in their opinions that this change might occur.
It is significant, though, that no dissenter stated a personal preference for capital punishment. Indeed, to the contrary, Justice Blackmun opined, "Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty. . .. ,,s0 Likewise, Chief Justice Burger asseverated:87
If we were possessed of legislative power, I would either join with
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall [who held capital
punishment unconstitutional per se] or, at the very least, restrict
the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most
heinous crimes.
Moreover, the tradition established by the late Justice Harlan lends
credence to the belief that the dissenting Justices may change their
votes in a future death penalty case. It was not unusual for Justice
Harlan to dissent from "landmark" decisions but to change his vote
when similar issues again came before the Court so as to align himself with the precedent established by the majority.88 Whether the
Furman dissenters adopt this tradition depends, to some extent, on
their view of Furman as a landmark case.
Third, it is unclear at what point on the continuum of sentencing
discretion a more rational sentencing system for the death penalty
85. Ehrhardt, Hubbart, Levinson, Smiley, Jr., & Wills, The Aftermath of Furman:
The FloridaExperience, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 2, 3 (1970).
86. 408 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. E.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 116 (1964) (Harlan, J.,concurring); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615-17 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Some commentators have noted a tendency of the Burger Court to follow precedents
established by the Warren Court. On this point, see Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on
the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 265; Kalven, The Supreme
Court: 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 5 (1971).
On the subject of precedent in
the United States Supreme Court, see Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in our
Constitutional Theory, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 589 (1931); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 735 (1949); Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in the Warren Years, 4 VALPARAISO L. REV. 101 (1969).
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will pass for Justices Stewart and White from being unacceptable to

being acceptable.

Although their two "pivotal"'

9

opinions were inter-

preted by some of the dissenters as countenancing only a mandatory
approach to reinstatement of capital punishment, 90 a more reasonable

reading of their opinions indicates that a certain degree of rationality,
not necessarily a perfect correspondence of convictions to death sentences, will suffice to assuage their reservations. 91 The degree of ra-

tionality is only speculative at this juncture, but at the very least it
must be great enough to provide "some meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from

the many cases in which it is not."9
Working within the uncertainty of these judicial parameters, a significant number of states have nonetheless reinstated the death sentence by the passage of new death penalty statutes.93 Among the first
of these states was Florida, which enacted its new statute in the latter
part of 1972.1' The statute was challenged, and in July 1973, the
Supreme Court of Florida upheld its constitutionality.9 5 In its ruling,
the court determined that "if the judicial discretion possible and necessary in imposing the death penalty. . . can be shown to be reasonable
and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory, the test of
Furman v. Georgia has been met." 96 It is thus clear that the Florida
89. The word "pivotal" is that of the Chief Justice. 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
90. Chief Justice Burger so interpreted the opinion of Justice White. Id. at 399
n.28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun interpreted likewise the opinion of
Justice Stewart. Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Powell arrived at the
same conclusion as to the opinions of both Justices Stewart and White. Id. at 41516 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. Wollan, The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 LOYOLA CHi. L.J. 339, 341
(1973).
92. 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J.,concurring).
93. To date, twenty-two states have enacted post-Furman death penalty statutes.
TIME, Mar. 25, 1974, at 10. Among them are the following: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Subsequent to the Time article, Pennsylvania became the
twenty-third state to adopt a post-Furman death penalty statute. Philadelphia Inquirer,
March 27, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 4; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 27, 1974, § I, at
1, col. 1.
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082, 782.04, 921.141 (Supp. 1972). The Florida statute differs from the new Illinois statute insofar as it provides for some jury input in
the sentencing proceeding and for specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Upon a murder conviction, the jury is to weigh statutorily prescribed aggravating and
mitigating circumstances at the sentencing hearing and, in consideration of such circumstances as they relate to the subject offense, is to render an advisory opinion to
the sentencing judge on imposition of the death penalty. Taking cognizance of the
jury's opinion, the sentencing judge, after his own weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is to decide to impose or not to impose the death penalty. Only
then may the death penalty be imposed.
95. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
96. Id. at 7.
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court envisaged the task of meeting Furman as one of refining judicial discretion, and not necessarily eliminating it.
THE NEW ILLINOIS STATUTE IN THE PALE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION

Indeed, the same judicial underpinning which guided Florida was
the basis upon which the new Illinois death penalty statute was premised. The Illinois legislators construed Furman to indicate that the
death sentence could still be an appropriate and constitutional penalty,
but that its imposition in the future could not remain pervaded with
the same potentialities for abuse of discretion that had previously been
condoned. 7 In most cases such abuse, it was felt, disadvantaged the
poor, non-whites, and those inadequately represented by counsel.9 8
In other words, the discretion of which Furman spoke was not discretion per se, but was the invidious discrimination resulting from
abuse of discretion at the sentencing stage of a trial.99
MandatorySentencing
Accordingly, the obvious answer to the consistent abuse of discretion was to remove all discretion in the sentencing of potential capital
offenders'" 0 by the adoption of a mandatory statute warranting automatic imposition of the death penalty upon conviction. This was, of
course, one of the legislative avenues left open by Furman pursuant
to the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion. 10 1 It was also a subject of
discussion in the concurring opinions of Justices Stewart, 1 1 2 White, 103
and Douglas,10 4 but none of these three specifically reached the question of a mandatory statute's constitutionality.
From a historical standpoint, the mandatory death penalty is not
novel. At common law it was applicable to all convicted murderers. 0 5
However, because the murder standard for capital offenses seemed
to encompass such a wide range of crimes, the sagacity of the mandatory death penalty was challenged. The phenomenon known as jury
97.
§ 1, at
98.
99.
§ 1, at

Hyde, Should death penalty be mandatory?, Chicago Tribune, August 21, 1973,
10, col. 3.
Hyde interview, supra note 35.
Hyde, Should death penalty be mandatory?, Chicago Tribune, August 21, 1973,
10, col. 3.

100. Id.
101. 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
102.
103.
104.

105.

Id. at 307-09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971).
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nullification saw many juries, moved by compassion, acquitting criminals altogether. That is, in appropriate cases calling for mercy, juries
failed to convict, not because they believed the defendant to be innocent, but because they believed the punishment to exceed the offense.
Consequently, most states abolished the mandatory death penalty between 1830 and 1900.106 In its stead, state legislatures proceeded
to give juries the discretion which juries had been exercising in fact,
permitting them to sentence the defendant to death or imprisonment. 0 Furman, by reawakening interest in mandatory statutes,
10 8
brings the criminal justice system full circle.
In reality, there exists no such animal as the mandatory death penalty. Discretion permeates the entire criminal justice system, from
police detection and arrest, through prosecutorial charging and plea
negotiation, to jury deliberation, appellate reconsideration, and executive pardon. 10 9
The same discretion exists in the Illinois system and will no doubt
affect the operation of the new death penalty statute. Thus, to call
the new statute mandatory in the strict sense of the word is to overlook
the discretion which subsists in traditionally discretionary areas beyond
judicial cognizance. The new statute does not purport to make the
death penalty mandatory in the image of a Kafkaesque death-force,
but only more mandatory than before Furman as to a more restricted
category of offenses.
The prosecution will continue to have its traditional discretionary
functions. It may choose not to bring a charge or to bring a lesser
charge, and it may choose to present or not to present certain evi106.

Id. at 198-200.

107. See Knowlton, Problems of fury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.
REV. 1099, 1102 & n.18 (1953); Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 50, 52 (1964).

108.

Note, The Remains of the Death Penalty: Furman v. Georgia, 22 DE PAUL L.

REV. 481, 496 (1972).
109. Wollan, The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 LOYOLA CHI. L.J. 339, 341
(1973). The elimination of such pervasive discretion has been propounded as a pre-

condition to the reinstatement of capital punishment in Florida.

Ehrhardt, Hubbart,

Levinson, Smiley, Jr., & Wills, The Aftermath of Furman: The Florida Experience,

64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 2, 3 (1973).

In fairness, this is a somewhat extreme position,

and it is perhaps unreasonable to expect legislation alone to eliminate something as
elusive as discretion. Note, 23 DE PAuL L. REV. 517, 522 n.42 (1973). A more fun-

damental consideration in assessing the validity of a mandatory sentencing system is
determining which discretion in the criminal justice system is within judicial cognizance. Dixon letter, supra note 74, at 61. For example, at least one lower federal
court has held that the prerogative of a prosecutor not to bring a charge is committed

to his discretion, and not the court's, under the doctrine of separation of powers.
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).

A plausible argument along an analogous line of reasoning could be made for executive
clemency as well. Dixon letter, supra note 74, at 61.
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dence, either at the trial or more importantly, at the sentencing hearing.110 Further, there is the discretion vested in the prosecution not
to move for a special sentencing hearing. The jury, for its part, will
continue to have the discretion not to convict or to convict on a lesser
charge. Significantly, pursuant to the statute, the three-judge sentencing panel will have the discretion to set aside a death sentence if it
feels there are "compelling reasons for mercy.""' At the appellate
level, discretion exists to reverse the conviction and/or the sentence." 2
Finally, the governor's discretion of granting executive pardon remains
unscathed. 113

It is thus clear that the new Illinois death penalty statute does not
eliminate discretion, but merely minimizes it at the most critical stage
of a capital proceeding-the sentencing-by divorcing what Furman
assumed to be one of the most aberrant discretionary variables in a
4
trial-the jury-from the sentencing function."
Whether this type of statute, as opposed to a strict mandatory type,
might command the support of a majority of the Court is uncertain.
Two members of the dissent, Chief Justice Burger" 5 and Justice
110. Zagel interview, supra note 33.
111. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-lA (1973).
112. Id.
113. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12 (1970). The Illinois Constitution declares:
The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses on such terms as he thinks proper. The manner of
applying therefore may be regulated by law.
On the statutory side of the coin, it is provided:
(a)
Petitions seeking pardon, commutation or reprieve shall be addressed
to the Governor and filed with the Parole and Pardon Board. The petition
shall be in writing and signed by the person under conviction or by a person
on his behalf. It shall contain a brief history of the case and the reasons for
executive clemency.
(d) The Governor shall decide each application and communicate his decision to the [Parole and Pardon] Board.

ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-13(a), (d) (1973).
114. See Memorandum from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative
Investigating Commission, to Charles Siragusa, Executive Director, Illinois Legislative
Investigating Commission, November 15, 1972. Mr. Nauert, who was primarily responsible for the drafting of the new Illinois statute, prefaced his legislative proposal
with the following statement:
[W]hen capital punishment is imposed at the discretion of juries in individual cases, it must be assumed that the state legislatures have determined
that in each of [the] . . . cases [in which the jury may recommend life imprisonment or the death penalty] imprisonment is as adequate as capital
punishment, and therefore death is an excessive penalty.
The implication to be drawn from these narrower opinions [in Furman] is
that capital punishment is constitutionally permissible if the legislature determines that it is the most effective and most necessary sanction which can
be applied to a particular offense. The death penalty must be mandatory in
these cases, and completely taken away from the discretion of juries. In Illinois, this means that the current provisions allowing juries in capital cases
to recommend the death penalty must be abandoned. . ..
115. 408 U.S. at 401-03 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Blackmun,"' expressed antipathy toward the latter type, viewing it
as regressive. Indeed, Justice Blackmun recognized the desirability
of mercy in the imposition of punishment, a quality not absent from
the new Illinois statute. 1 7 Such considerations notwithstanding, it is
more likely that the new statute risks being too discretionary than it
does being too mandatory." 18
Narrowing of Capital Offenses
The spectrum of potential capital offenses is vast. If nothing else,
Furman indicates that the choice of actual capital offenses should be
one for the legislature and not for the jury. The experience of jury
nullification demonstrated that juries, when asked to consider a potentially capital offense, made discretionary distinctions as to its capital
nature on the basis of circumstances surrounding the crime. Conceptually, the band of the criminal spectrum designated as the potential
capital offense zone was too broad, in view of every crime's uniqueness, to warrant imposition of the death penalty in every instance. Perhaps this conflict between the legislative will and the popular will derived from the legislature's intent to be comprehensive and the jury's
wish to be humane.
With the renaissance of mandatory or semi-mandatory systems, the
torch must pass from the jury to the legislature to select capital offenses. In essence, the legislature must predetermine with relative certainty "those offenses which are so reprehensible that the death pen116.

Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

117. Id. If, as Justice White points out in his Furman opinion, id. at 311-14 passim (White, J., concurring), frequency of execution is a concern, it is possible that a
system which retains some discretion may result in more executions than one which
is completely mandatory. See Reidel, The Effect of Mandatory and Discretionary
Death Sentences on Commutations and Executions in Pennsylvania, REPORT OF THE
[PENN.]

GovERNoR's

STUDY COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

86, 95

(1973).

The study compared the effects of using a discretionary sentencing system as opposed
to a mandatory sentencing system in Pennsylvania and arrived at the following conclusion:

Our results indicate that offenders under discretionary sentences were sig-

nificantly more frequently executed than offenders with mandatory sentences;

contrawise, more offenders were commuted under mandatory sentences than
under discretionary sentences.
Id. If a shift toward a more mandatory sentencing system includes the possibility of

greater use of executive pardon on the part of governors, then it may be desirable,
in view of Furman's stress on rationality, to formulate some standards to guide governors in their exercise of clemency. Statement of L. Harold Levinson, Law Center,
University of Florida, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in Hearings on S. 1, S. 1400,
and S. 1401 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 154-55 (1973). See
Illinois provisions, constitutional and statutory, on executive clemency in note 113 supra.

118.
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alty is singularly appropriate in all cases.""" Under the new Illinois statute, capital offenses are limited to types of murder, to murders
committed under prescribed aggravating circumstances. This is only
are many, and since some
reasonable, since the varieties of murder
120
murders are less premeditated than others.
In designating capital offenses, attention was directed by the drafters of the Illinois statute to the requirements of Furman, to the Ilinois Constitution, and to general principles of due process so that the
classes of offenses which warranted the death penalty would be drawn
narrowly and with great specificity. The legislative intent was to list
only those crimes which required the death penalty for maximum deterrence. 121 Since such crimes would comprise only an infinitesimal
part of the total number of killings, it was recognized that imposition
of the death penalty would remain a relatively rare occurrence. 2 '
By applying various factors to the general murder standard, the statute's drafters arrived at a dichotomy between capital and non-capital
murders. To the extent that these factors serve to qualify murders
as capital or non-capital, aggravating circumstances under the new statute become, for purposes of statutory analysis, synonymous with capital
murder categories,' 3 and further, for purposes of statutory interpretation, the ambit of each category warrants delimitation.
First, the terms "peace officer" and "fireman" in the statute's provision making the murder of a peace officer or a fireman a capital
offense envisage the protection of not only salaried' 24 members of
those classes but volunteer and part-time workers as well. Since the
focus of the provision was functional, and not administrative, the drafters felt that the latter group of workers were entitled to a degree
of protection no lower than that afforded the former. Moreover, since
many of the workers in the volunteer and part-time group receive pensions and benefits, a distinction on the basis of remuneration becomes
119. Memorandum from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, to Charles Siragusa, Executive Director, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, November 15, 1972. See the observation of Justice Powell
on this point, indicating this to be a legislative determination of which circumstances
warrant retention of capital punishment in the public interest. 408 U.S. at 437-38
(Powell, J., dissenting).
120. Hyde, Should death penalty be mandatory?, Chicago Tribune, August 21, 1973,
§ 1, at 10, col. 3.
121. Memorandum from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, to Charles Siragusa, Executive Director, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, November 15, 1972.
122. Id.
123. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 206 n.16 (1971).
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 10-3-1 to 2 (1973).
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irrelevant.125
The provision covering the murder of prison personnel is intended
to extend to prison visitors and invitees as well. Its purpose is to
deter inmates from taking such individuals as hostages in the event
of a disturbance or an escape attempt. 2
The provision concerning multiple murders is intended to apply to
two types of offenders: mass killers (as in the Speck case, or as in
the case of an arsonist) and repeat offenders. Accordingly, any individual convicted of murdering two or more persons, at any time,
1 27
stands to receive the death penalty.
The provision dealing with hijacking murders purposes to serve the
economic and social necessity of facilitating free access to public transportation. 12 8 It envisions the application of normal conflicts rules,
which exclude criminal laws from choice-of-law concern,' 2 9 to troublesome interstate situations. 130 Thus, in the case of a hijacking murder
committed on a public conveyance in transit from Illinois to another
state without capital punishment, a court of the other state which had
concurrent jurisdiction over the defendant with an apppropriate Illinois
court' and which had obtained its jurisdiction before the Illinois court
125. Memorandum from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, to Charles Siragusa, Executive Director, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, November 15, 1972. See exact wording of statute at note 44
supra.
126. Id. See exact wording of statute at note 44 supra.
127. Id. See exact wording of statute at note 44 supra.
128. Id. See exact wording of statute at note 44 supra.

129.

R.

CRAMPTON

& D.

CURRIE. CONFLICT OF LAWS

46 (1968).

130. Telephone interview with Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative
Investigating Commission, February 22, 1974.
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-5(a)(l), (b) (1973).
For example, a hijacker
might assemble a bomb in Illinois, setting it to explode sometime during an interstate
trip from Illinois to another state. If the bomb exploded in the other state, killing
at least one other person aboard the public conveyance, both Illinois and the other
state would conceivably have jurisdiction over the defendant. The Illinois criminal jurisdictional statute provides:
(Ch. 38, par. 1-5)
Sec. 1-5. State Criminal Jurisdiction. (a) A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense which he commits, while either within or
outside the State, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:
(1)
The offense is committed either wholly or partly within the State;
(b)
An offense is committed partly within this State, if either the conduct
which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an element,
occurs within the State. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death, or the death itself; and if the body of a homicide
victim is found within the State, the death is presumed to have occurred
within the State.
Id. The drafters of the jurisdictional statute were aware of the interests to be served
by the statute:
The purpose of Section 1-5 of the Code is to establish a broad jurisdictional
basis for the prosecution in Illinois of offenses involving persons, property,
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would apply the substantive criminal law of the forum, without reference to Illinois law.1 2 Further, the hijacking provision envisions the
application of the Illinois double jeopardy statute. 3 ' Thus, if the
prosecution in the other state as to the murder offense resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, the Illinois court would be barred
34
from further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.1
The contract murder provision making the act of killing for hire
a capital offense is to be restricted in its application to those situations
in which some consideration has passed to the murderer for committing the act. It was thought that, among all the categories covered
by the statute, deterrence would be highest in this category. 1 35

This

provision does not extend to the person giving the consideration for
committing the act.
The provision making murder incident to the commission of a felony
a capital offense follows the definitions of robbery,13 6 rape, 37 aggravated kidnapping, 1 3 arson,13' and the indecent molestation of a
child 40 used in the Illinois Criminal Code.14 1 The drafters were careand public interests in the State ....
A person's location within or outside
the state, when the offense is committed, and his legal relation to the offense
as a principal or accessory, are immaterial for purposes of jurisdiction if the
offense has the features described in [the jurisdictional statute].
"Partly within this State" is intended to cover all situations included in offenses commenced outside and consummated within this state and those commenced within and consummated outside this state. .

.

Probably the most

common situation to which the provision would apply is that of a homicide,
elements of which occur in different jurisdictions; and in view of its importance, homicide is particularly mentioned in subsection (b), the effect of
which is that the State may prosecute although only the conduct which puts
in motion the instrument or agency of death occurs in Illinois ...
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE § 1-5, Committee Comments 20 (1961)
(emphasis added).
132. R. CRAMPTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 46 (1968).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4(c) (1973). The drafters of the double jeopardy
statute made an interesting observation:
Section 3-4(c). A third application of the doctrine of double jeopardy involves the recognition of a former prosecution in another jurisdiction, such
as a Federal court or a court of another state. This application is statutory,
not required by constitutional guaranty or common-law rules ...
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE § 3-4, Committee Comments 218 (1961).
134. Telephone interview with Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative
Investigating Commission, February 22, 1974.
135. Memorandum from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, to Charles Siragusa, Executive Director, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, November 14, 1972. See exact wording of statute at note 44
supra.

136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 18-1(a) (1973).
137. Id.§ ll-I(a)-(b).
138. Id. § 10-2(a).
139. Id.§ 20-1(a)-(b).
140. Id. § 11-4(a).
141. Telephone interview with Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative
Investigating Commission, February 22, 1974.
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ful to include in this provision only those felonies which the perpetra1 42
tor could reasonably expect to result in fatalities.
The Bifurcated Trial
Once capital offense categories have been established by the legislature, it becomes important to develop a process for determination
of the existence of the aggravating circumstances by which the categories are defined. For this, the statute provides a special sentencing hearing conducted by a three-judge panel, one of whom shall
be, if possible, the trial judge.' 4 ' The drafters were concerned about
the possibility that the death of the trial judge in the hiatus between
the guilt-finding hearing and the sentencing hearing might preclude
the continuation of the trial and the imposition of sentence. Accordingly, provision was made for the possibility of a sentencing hearing
without the participation of the trial judge.
The statute's provision for a bifurcated trial, dividing a capital proceeding into a guilt phase and a punishment phase, is not novel. Illinois boasted of such a system before Furman,' as did other states.' 4 5
The advantage of the bifurcated trial as opposed to the unitary trial
is that the bifurcated trial affords the defendant greater flexibility in
the presentation of his case. Thus, he may choose to invoke the fifth
amendment on the issue of his guilt and, upon a verdict of guilty, may
yet present evidence on the issue of punishment without jeopardizing
his chances for acquittal.
On the other hand, under a unitary system, the defendant must
make a more difficult choice. By remaining silent to protect himself
on the issue of guilt, he surrenders any chance to plead his case on
the issue of punishment. But should he chance to offer character evidence through his own testimony in order to influence the jury on
the issue of punishment, he risks the likelihood that the prosecution
will introduce evidence of past crimes and bad character that might
seriously prejudice his case on the issue of guilt.14 6 Pressed between
these alternatives, the defendant finds himself impaled on the horns
14 7
of a dilemma.
142.

Letter from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating

Commission, to Rep. Joseph G. Sevcik (R.-Berwyn), December 7, 1972.
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1A (1973).
144. Id. § 1005-4-1.
145. See Note, Bifurcating Florida's Capital Trials: Two Steps Are Better Than
One, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 127, 135 nn.67-72 (1971).
146. See Handler, Background Evidence in Murder Cases, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
317, 325-27 (1960).

147.
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If Furman stresses the need for a more rational imposition of cap-

ital punishment, the adoption of a bifurcated trial procedure seems
consistent with that need. Certainly, a rational distinction can be
drawn between evidence bearing on guilt and evidence bearing on
punishment. In the wake of Furman, some states have in fact adopted
the bifurcated system.14 8 However, the sentencing hearings under
these new statutes are not necessarily the same as those under preFurman statutes. In some states, indeed in Illinois, at the hearing
in capital cases the evidence is to be restricted to circumstances related
to the offense which warrant or preclude imposition of the death penalty. 14 9 In other states, the hearing is to include consideration of such
circumstances and, in addition, consideration of any other evidence
relevant to the issue of punishment.'
At least one federal proposal
admits both evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime and
any other relevant evidence at the hearing,' while another limits admission to mitigating and aggravating factors, dropping the hearsay restriction as to the defendant, but keeping it as to the prosecution.' 52
Under the new Illinois statute, there is not only a hearsay restriction
as to both the prosecution and the defendant, 5 3 but a restriction as
to evidence of circumstances surrounding the crime as well. While
most post-Furman statutes provide for consideration of both aggravating and mitigating factors, the new Illinois statute provides for consideration of aggravating factors only, subject to the exercise of the mercy
provision in extraordinary cases. 15 4 The restricted scope of the evitional scrutiny. In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967), the United States
Supreme Court held that the possibility of some collateral prejudice to the defendant
under a unitary system did not violate due process. In the more recent case on this
question, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213-14 (1971), the petitioner Crampton contended that the unitary procedure in Ohio forced him to waive his right not
to be a witness against himself in order to assert his right to be heard on the punishment issue. The Court rejected this argument by comparing the defendant's position
to other constitutionally accepted procedures that require defendants to make difficult
choices at trial. E.g., United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 164 & n.1 (1954) (defendant whose motion for acquittal at close of prosecution's case is denied must decide
whether to put on a defense and risk strengthening the government's case).
148. E.g., ANN. CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 190.1-2 (Supp. 1974); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2929.03(D)-(E) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp. 1972).

149.

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 38, § 1005-8-lA (1973); see also

ANN.

CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1974).
150. Omo REV. CODE § 2929.03 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.
1972).
151. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-4E2(b) (1973).
152. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2402(b) (1973).
153. Hyde interview, supra note 35.
154. The new statute provides:
The 3 judge court shall . . . hear evidence of the foregoing
circumstances [warranting mandatory imposition of the death
if a majority of the judges of such court determines that any
facts occurred, then the court shall sentence the defendant to

CAL. [PENAL]

§ 921.141 (Supp.

[aggravating]
penalty] and
of the above
death unless
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dence at the sentencing hearing issues from a legislative intent to
direct the legal focus to "the nature of the crime or the identity of
the victim" and away from the defendant.115 This evidentiary restriction was made in a spirit of compliance with Furman, since character
evidence, extraneous to the circumstances of the offense, invites the
exercise of unwanted discretion.
There is, however, pre-Furman authority to the contrary. In one
instance, the Supreme Court, in upholding as consistent with due process a death sentence imposed by a judge on the basis of hearsay information following a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, observed, "Highly relevant-if not essential-to the judge's selection
of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. 1 5 6
Set against the sentencing philosophy which espouses fullest information concerning the defendant is the new Illinois statute, which envisages a doubly restricted evidentiary scope at capital sentencing hearings. While such restrictions increase sentencing rationality, they decrease the scope of evidence which a defendant may present. Due
process may require that a defendant, when confronted with the potentiality of a death sentence, be permitted to present hearsay evi1
dence and evidence of mitigating factors surrounding his crime. 7
Moreover, the new Illinois statute creates the anomalous situation of
permitting a broader evidentiary scope at non-capital sentencing hearings than it does at capital sentencing hearings, since the former allows
"evidence . . . offered . . . in . . . mitigation,"' 8 including hearsay,
while the latter is limited to evidence of a non-hearsay nature regarding the aggravating circumstances only. In short, the new Illinois statute presents the question of due process countervailed by sentencing
rationality. Indeed, if increased rationality in the capital sentencing
process is mandated by Furman, the restricted evidentiary scope at the
sentencing hearing under the new statute may have to be part of the
constitutional price exacted for achieving such rationality.
a majority of the judges of such court determines that there are compelling
reasons for mercy and that the defendant should not be sentenced to death.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1A (1973). See text accompanying notes 187-99
infra.
155. Hyde, Should death penalty be mandatory?, Chicago Tribune, August 21, 1973,

§ 1, at 10, col. 3.
156. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
157. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 218 (1971).
This threshold question
was never answered by McGautha because the Court was able to decide the case without considering it.
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(a)(3) (1973).

376

1974

New Death Penalty

JudicialImposition of Sentences
At common law, the sentencing power was reposed in the judiciary,
and in the judiciary alone. 1 9 However, bad experiences with the
royal juries in England and the absence of "substantial difference[s]
in training, competence, experience or intelligence between judge and
jury" motivated the American colonists to make their criminal juries
a more integral part of the sentencing process. 16 0 This evolution continued until juries came to assume primary responsibility for the imposition of capital punishment in most states, including Illinois.'
In
jury cases in Illinois before Furman, the death penalty could be visited
upon the defendant only if the jury gave to the court an initial recommendation to that effect.' 62
Because Furman explicitly recognized the abuse to which juries are
prone when exercising their sentencing discretion,' 6' a logical alternative is to lower overall sentencing discretion and to transfer sentencing
authority to the judiciary in capital cases. This assumes, however, that
judges are, in the main, less arbitrary than juries. It is generally believed, for example, that judges, because of their experience and training, are less influenced by emotion and prejudice than are juries."
Moreover, it is also believed that judicial determinations are apt to
be more uniform than those of juries. 16'
By contrast, from a penological perspective, there are equally compelling arguments for jury imposition of the death sentence. Advocates of a jury sentencing system contend that capital punishment
"should reflect the judgment of a cross section of the public" and that
one individual should not "bear the sole responsibility for making this
159. See generally S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 122 & n.52
(1963); NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23-28 (1931); Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV.
968, 970-72 (1967).
160. NATIONAL

COMM'N

ON LAW OBSERVANCE

AND

ENFORCEMENT,

REPORT ON

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27 (1931 ).

161.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386 n.10 (1972)

(Burger, C.J., dissenting);

Bedau, General Introduction [to Capital Punishment], CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7, 31 (J.
McCafferty ed. 1972).

162.

163.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(b) (Supp. 1972).

408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).

164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See
also LaFont, Assessment of Punishment-A Judge or Jury Function?, 38 TEXAS L. REV.
835, 842-43 (1960); accord State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973). See Togman,
The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 50, 51-54 (1964).
165. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). This
is not to derogate the qualifications of juries to impose sentence. Justice Frankfurter,
for one, has stated, "I do not understand the view that juries are not qualified to discriminate between situations calling for mitigated sentences."
LAW AND MEN 87 (1956).

F.

FRANKFURTER,

OF
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grave decision."'166 It is also contended that "jurors do not become
calloused to the fate of defendants"' 6 as easily as judges and that
jurors are less susceptible of bowing to political and public pressures.16 8 These arguments are attenuated, however, by the recognition that many of the best qualified members of the community, e.g.,
doctors, lawyers, and clergymen, are accorded statutory exclusions
from jury service which deprive the average jury of members whose
education and experience are desirable in the sentencing process.16 9
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Furman, observed that
the death penalty, to be an effective deterrent, must be imposed with
frequency sufficient at least to pose a credible threat to criminals. 170
Otherwise, it is relegated to a mere symbolic sanction. 171 If frequency
of imposition is a legitimate concern, then the new Illinois statute,
which places sentencing authority in capital cases in the exclusive
realm of the judiciary, may very well serve to allay frequency disquietude by increasing the incidence of death sentences to a point where
the death penalty deterrent is credible. Available evidence indicates
that under systems in which the judge determines -the sentence, the
death penalty is imposed with a slightly greater frequency than under
72
systems in which the jury makes the determination.'
But while concern for the frequency of imposition is one of the
topics to which Furman addressed itself, 1 73 there are other concerns
as well. The mere transfer of sentencing authority from the jury to
the judge does not magically metamorphose an otherwise arbitrary system into a rational one. One concern not immune from criticism is
the sentencing discretion of judges. 74 Significantly, there is evi166. Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 969 (1967). See also
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 201-02 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 253 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUNES 389 (1956); Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899).
167. Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 989 (1967).
168. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 26 (1967); see also Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 989-91 (1967).
169. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 4 (1973).
170. 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
171. Wollan, The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 LOYOLA Cm. L.J. 339, 345
(1973).
172.

H.

KALVEN

& H.

ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY

436 (1966); Kalven & Zeisel,

The American Jury and the Death Penalty, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 769, 771 (1966).
173. See, e.g., the opinion of Justice Stewart in Furman. Justice Stewart, on this
point, remarked:
[I]t is equally clear these sentences are "unusual" in the sense that the
penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder, and that its imposition
for rape is extraordinarily rare.
408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).

174.
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dence to support the contention that variations in judges may cause
variations in sentences. 17 5 As one former judge declared, "Judges,
I think, tend to be like people, perhaps even some cuts above the
mine run but, unfortunately, less than gods or angels."' 76 If this be
true, the delegation of sentencing authority in capital trials to a threejudge panel, as proposed in the new Illinois statute, may not serve
to reduce judicial discretion as much as might be supposed.
However, in defense of the new statute, certain aspects of its provisions should be noted. First, the panel's discretion is tightly circumscribed by the sentencing hearing's evidentiary scope, limited as it is
to the aggravating circumstances of the offense.' 77 Further, there is
perhaps some safety in numbers: Three judges pronouncing sentence
are better than one. A comparable death penalty statute in Ohio vests
complete sentencing authority in jury cases in only the single trial
judge. 17 On the other hand, in non-jury cases the Ohio statute requires a three-judge panel, which must furthermore vote unanimously
for the death sentence if such sentence is to be imposed. 1 79 By contrast, the new Illinois statute, in either a jury or a non-jury case, requires the concurrence of only two of the three judges on the panel
for imposition of the death penalty.'
While unanimous verdicts may
not be constitutionally required in sentencing, they may be desirable
in capital cases, given the stakes. Admittedly, once unanimity is required, frequency of imposition is potentially reduced.
In further defense of the statute it should be noted that the drafters
included two provisions which are intended to render the three-judge
clude that petitioners' sentences must be set aside because juries and judges have abused
their sentencing discretion); id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) (the system of law
confronted in Furman leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination of whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty). Accord, State
v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761, 764 (Del. 1972). In Dickerson, the Supreme Court of
Delaware considered a mercy provision in the Delaware death penalty statute which
vested unlimited discretion in judges and juries to change a death sentence to life imprisonment. The provision, quite similar in this regard to its Illinois counterpart, was
invalidated by the court on the basis of Furman. In analyzing Furman, the court declared: "Manifestly . ..the effect of Furman is to invalidate the uncontrolled discretionary imposition of the death penalty by the jury or judge." 298 A.2d at 764 (emphasis added).
175. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 21 (1973). Frankel,
in his critique, ventures a number of legislative proposals for rationalizing the sentencing function, inter alia: the articulation of a legislative definition of sentencing objectives; a quantified codification of weights and measures to be utilized in assessing the
gravity of a crime; appellate review of sentences; the convocation of judicial sentencing
councils; the permanent establishment of a commission on sentencing. Id. at 103 et
seq.

176.
177.
178
179.

Id. at 12.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1A (1973).
Omuo REv. CODE § 2929.03(C)(2) (Supp. 1973).

Id. § 2929.03(C)(1), (E).

180. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 38, § 1005-8-IA (1973).
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panel accountable for its actions: the two-part appellate process'' and
the writing requirement.. 82 As to the first, there are prescribed criteria by which the panel's actions may be reviewed.'8 " As to the second, there are admittedly no prescribed criteria, but the purpose is
to encourage the panel to express the reasons for its actions. 8 4 In
addition, the prosecution still has its burden of proving the aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.8 5 Finally, the use of a
three-judge sentencing panel greatly facilitates the selection of a jury
in capital cases, since potential Witherspoon problems are avoided.' 8
The Mercy Provision
If the new Illinois statute contains an Achilles heel vulnerable to
constitutional attack, it is the provision permitting the three-judge
panel to refrain from imposing the death sentence if it determines
there are "compelling reasons for mercy."'18 7 At first blush, this provision seems to encompass the type of unbridled discretion which Furman denounced.'8 8 However, analysis of legislative intent reveals that
the inclusion of such a provision derives from a desire to furnish a
safety valve in the mandatory operation of the statute, and not from
a desire to revert to a pre-Furman discretionary standard.' 89 In 1959,
the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code attempted to define those
criteria which a jury might apply in deciding to exercise or not to exercise mercy in a capital case. They conceded the impossibility of drafting a strict formula, but they did feel that it was possible to isolate
"the main circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that should
181.

Id.

182. Id. § 9-1(b).
183. These criteria are race, creed, sex or economic status. Id. § 1005-8-1A.
184. The statute merely provides:
After such determination [as to whether sentence should be imposed under Section 5-5-3 (non-capital crimes) or Section 5-8-IA (capital crimes) of the Unified Code of Corrections] by a majority of the 3 judge court and notice to the
trial judge of their decision in writing the trial judge shall enter sentence accordingly.
Id. § 9-1(b) (emphasis added).
185. Id. § 1005-8-1A.
186. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
187. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-IA (1973). See note 44 supra for full word-

ing of statute.

188. See Note, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 517, 523 (1973).
189. As early as 1949, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment had attempted to define those circumstances by which a jury might rationalize the exercise
or non-exercise of mercy in a capital case. While recommending that the English jury
be given discretionary power to find "extenuating circumstances" in a given case, the
Commission expressly conceded the impossibility of drafting a formula which would
provide a reasonable standard for considering the manifold circumstances which affect
the gravity of a capital crime. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Cmd. 8932,
553(b),
595 (1949-53).
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be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented

in a concrete [capital] case."' 90
190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The
draftsmen of the Model Penal Code arrived at a formulation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which was not intended to be exhaustive:
Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962, and changes of
July 30, 1962):
(1)
Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of murder, the Court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first degree if it is
satisfied that:
(a)
none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3)
of this Section was established by the evidence at the trial or will be established if further proceedings are initiated under Subsection (2) of this Section;
or
(b)
substantial mitigating circumstances, established by the evidence at
the trial, call for leniency; or
(c)
the defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the
approval of the Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the first degree; or
(d)
the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime; or
(e)
the defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or
(f)
although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.
(2)
Determination by Court or by Court and Jury. Unless the Court imposes sentence under Subsection (I) of this Section, it shall conduct a separate proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced for
a felony of the first degree or sentenced to death. The proceeding shall be
conducted before the Court alone if the defendant was convicted by a Court
sitting without a jury or upon his plea of guilty or if the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant waive a jury with respect to sentence. In other cases it
shall be conducted before the Court sitting with the jury which determined
the defendant's guilt or, if the Court for good cause shown discharges that
jury, with a new jury empanelled for the purpose.
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the
Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and
circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history,
mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such
evidence, not legally privileged, which the court deems to have probative
force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary
rules of evidence, provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence. The prosecuting attorney and the defendant
or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence
of death.
The determination whether sentence of death shall be imposed shall be in
the discretion of the Court, except that when the proceeding is conducted before the Court sitting with a jury, the Court shall not impose sentence of
death unless it submits to the jury the issue whether the defendant should
be sentenced to death or to imprisonment and the jury returns a verdict that
the sentence should be death. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous
verdict, the Court shall dismiss the jury and impose sentence for a felony of
the first degree.
The Court, in exercising its discretion as to sentence, and the jury, in determining upon its verdict, shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) and any other facts
that it deems relevant, but it shall not impose or recommend sentence of death
unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection
(3) and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency. When the issue is submitted to the jury, the
Court shall so instruct and also shall inform the jury of the nature of the
sentence of imprisonment that may be imposed, including its implication with
respect to possible release upon parole, if the jury verdict is against sentence
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There was subsequent support for adoption of the Model Penal
Code's formulation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in connection with capital cases. In McGautha v. California the Supreme
Court had the opportunity of determining the constitutional necessity

of providing a jury in a capital case with some reasonable guide similar to the Model Penal Code's proposal to aid the jury in its sentencing
deliberations. On this point, the Court firmly held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require that juries
be given judicially articulated formulae by which to determine whether
to impose the death penalty."'
1 92
With the advent of Furman, McGautha was seemingly overruled,'
and some states began to incorporate the Model Penal Code's standof death.
[Alternative version of Subsection (2), providing for determination of sentence by the Court in all cases, omitted.]
(3)

Aggravating Circumstances.

(4)

Mitigating Circumstances.

(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was
an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity.
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect
or intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
191. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971).
192. Dixon statement, supra note 80, at 50-51. McGautha was considered under
the due process and equal protection clauses alone; Furman was considered under the
cruel and unusual punishment prohibition and the due process clause, with references,
in some opinions, to the equal protection clause.
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Illinois' new statute is

unique, inasmuch as it adopts the Code's aggravating circumstances,

but not its mitigating circumstances, as a sentencing guide.
When consideration was being given by the Illinois statute's drafters
to the possible codification of mitigating circumstances, which usually
include factors such as youth, mental condition, necessity, and complicity with slight participation, it was determined that the Model Penal
Code's formulation did not comprehend every conceivable situation
that might arise under the statute and was therefore, in the judicial
sense, unacceptable."' Thus the Penal Code's formulation of mitigat-

ing circumstances was deliberately omitted from the new Illinois statute out of a desire on the part of the statute's drafters to avoid poten-

tial injustices arising from a rigid and exclusive listing of such circumstances. Such a listing, it was thought, would only result in the Procrustean exercise of attempting to fit infinitely varied factors into uniform categories. It was deemed far better to formulate a mitigating
standard broad enough to subsume every conceivable factual situation
yet narrow enough to meet the emphasis of Furman on rationality.
The resulting omnibus standard, which permits judicial consideration of "compelling reasons for mercy," was intended to add a humane
element to the statute which would come into play only in the extraordinary case. Such an extraordinary case might arise in a situation
where the facts fell within the ambit of the statute-that is, where
the aggravating circumstances warranting the death penalty were present-but where factors relating to the aggravating circumstances indi193. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3)-(4) (Supp. 1972); ANN. CAL. [PENAL] CODE
§ 190.2-.3 (Supp. 1974); ci. S. 1, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 1-4El(b)(1)-(3) (1973); S.
1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2401(a)-(b) (1973). The adoption of these standards
is in compliance with Chief Justice Burger's invitation to the state legislatures and to
Congress in Furman. 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). S. 1401, which consists of the death penalty provisions of S. 1400 segregated from the latter's omnibus
criminal code reform provisions, was passed by the United States Senate on March 13,
1974 by a vote of 54-33 after the adoption of several amendments. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, March 16, 1974, at 708. One of these amendments required that aggravating factors under the bill's provisions be proved to exist "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
not merely "by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 705. For the provision of the
new Illinois statute on this point, see text accompanying notes 49 and 185 supra. For
a complete record of Senate debate concerning amendments to and passage of S. 1401,
see 120 CONG. REC. S 3506 (daily ed. March 12, 1974) and 120 CONG. REc. S 3658
(daily ed. March 13, 1974). Interestingly, the United States House of Representatives
passed its own death penalty bill, H.R. 3858, which, although more restrictive than the
Senate bill, provides for imposition of the death penalty in connection with defined hijacking crimes, on March 13, 1974 by a vote of 361-47. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
March 16, 1974, at 709-10.
194. Hyde interview, supra note 35. As the McGautha court stated, "The infinite
variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boiler-plate' or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need." McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
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cated the crime to be utterly beyond the scope of possible situations
envisaged by the drafters.' 9 5 The omnibus standard does not contemplate the consideration of factors remotely related to the aggravating

circumstances, but only those of a proximate nexus, such as events
immediately preceding the capital offense murder. 190

Whether this mercy provision will pass constitutional muster in the
context of Furman is questionable. Much depends on how narrowly
the provision is interpreted. 19 7 It can be argued that there is less
need for tightly defined standards where three judges are responsible
for sentencing than where juries play a part in sentencing, since the
judges' experience might obviate the need for such statutory precision.
On the other hand, due process in the wake of Furman may require
that a defendant be able to determine through specific and unambigu-

ous statutory formulations those circumstances which might preclude
imposition of the death penalty, just as he should, by the same token,
be able to determine those circumstances which might warrant it. Of
course, the writing requirement prescribed in the statute 9 8 may com195. Hyde interview, supra note 35.
196. An example of an extraordinary situation to which the drafters had reference
was the murder of an on-duty policeman by his wife subsequent to an altercation at
his home before the policeman went on duty. Governor Walker made reference to
this extraordinary situation in his amendatory veto of House Bill 18. Letter from Governor Daniel Walker to the Members of the Illinois House of Representatives, September 12, 1973.
197. Zagel interview, supra note 33. The drafters' interpretation of the mercy provision is less than pellucid, primarily because the provision is, by its very nature, an
omnibus standard not susceptible to easy definition. The drafters did discuss the meaning of the provision in the context of their efforts to clarify Governor Walker's specific
recommendations for changes in House Bill 18, which recommendations accompanied

his amendatory veto:

My first recommendation concerns the Governor's wish that the three judge
panel have the discretion to impose a prison term rather than the death penalty. As intimated in the Governor's message, there will always be cases
where fundamental fairness and justice require a term of years rather than
capital punishment-even in the most heinous forms of murder which HB 18
has isolated. I endorse this concept and applaud the Governor's wisdom in
calling for its inclusion.
My difficulty is in the terminology recommended by the Governor. His
suggested amendment would grant the three judge panel the authority to divert
capital punishment where a majority finds "compelling reasons" for doing so.
I believe that this term, standing alone, is unconstitutionally vague.
It should be noted that we are delimiting the sentencing powers of the panel
only with regard to the traditional exercise of judicial clemency. Since that
is the limit of the court's discretion, I think it would be wise to say so.
Thus I would suggest modifying the Governor's wording to grant the sentencing judges the discretion to not impose the death penalty where a majority
found "compelling reasons for mercy." In my opinion the phrase "for mercy"
would remove any vagueness or ambiguities that might otherwise result.
Letter from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, to William Goldberg, Counsel to the Governor of Illinois, September 24, 1973
(first emphasis added).
198. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (1973). See note 184 supra for exact wording of statute.

1974

New Death Penalty

pel the three-judge panel to articulate such mitigating and aggravating
considerations, but there is no specific assurance on this point.
In the final analysis, if the mercy provision suffers from vagueness,
there are perhaps more Gargantuan problems associated with the
vagueness inherent in legislatively prescribed mitigating circumstances.
Standards such as youth, duress, necessity, complicity with slight participation, and absence of a significant history of prior criminal activity
do not lend themselves to easy legal definition.' 9 9 Any attempt to
close one Pandora's box by more precisely defining mitigating circumstances may well open another of greater dimensions. This is perhaps the dilemma of any post-Furmandeath penalty statute.
FinalAdjudication
The statute provides that any individual sentenced to death may not
be executed until there has been a final adjudication of the statute's
constitutionality. Moreover, the new statute declares that final adjudication means merely the completion of the appellate process in a
2
single case and not necessarily the exhaustion of available remedies. 11
Even if the defendant has not availed himself of such extraordinary
remedies as coram nobis or habeas corpus, the adjudication will be
deemed final.20 '
Under the new statute, there seems to be one inconsistency in connection with sentencing where the death sentence is overturned on
appeal. If the statute is found unconstitutional, the defendant is sen20 2
tenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than fourteen years.
Likewise, if the specific murder of which the defendant is convicted
is deemed to fall outside the enumerated capital offense categories,
he is sentenced to a minimum of fourteen years imprisonment.20 3 On
the other hand, if the appellate court concludes that the sentencing
procedure in a particular case was infected with discrimination on the
basis of race, creed, sex, or economic status, the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment. 20 4 This inconsistency may be violative
of the equal protection clause.20 5 It is suggested that a better sentencing alternative would be to make the respective sentences uniform
199.

See State v. Dixon, 83 So. 2d 1, 17-18 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting).

200. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-IA (1973).
201. Telephone interview with Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative
Investigating Commission, February 22, 1974.
202. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-IA (1973).
203. Id.
204. Id.

205.

Note, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 517, 523 (1973).
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in all cases where the death penalty is commuted to a lesser sentence.
THE NEW ILLINOIS STATUTE IN THE PALE OF THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION

For most death penalty statutes, passing constitutional muster is a
two-hurdled affair. There is the Federal Constitution, and there is
the state constitution. Even if the new Illinois statute, for its part,
survives federal constitutional scrutiny, it remains prey to attack on
the state constitutional level.
Historically, the authority of the state to impose the punishment of
death under the 1870 Illinois Constitution was accorded an expansive
interpretation. 06 The Illinois Supreme Court had adhered to the general position that an objection to a penalty established by the legislature would not be sustained unless it was a cruel and degrading punishment unknown to the common law, or so "wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.

' '20 7

Today, under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, an attack on the new
death penalty statute would, in all likelihood, be two-pronged: a substantive attack in connection with the new constitution's rehabilitation
provision and a procedural attack in connection with the Illinois General Assembly's constitutional authority to change the composition of
circuit courts and to provide for appellate court review in capital cases.
The RehabilitationProvision
While there is no express protection in the 1970 Illinois Constitution
against "cruel and unusual punishment" in the terms of the Federal
2 08
Constitution, there is a related protection which stipulates:
All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender
to useful citizenship ...
It is generally agreed that this penalty protection and its analogue in
the 1870 Illinois Constitution are lineal descendants of the federal prohibition contained in the eighth amendment. 20 9 In comparing the two
206. See G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONsTrruTION: AN ANNOTATED AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 52 (1969).
207. People v. Elliott, 272 Ill.
592, 601, 112 N.E. 300, 304 (1916).
208. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1970).
209. G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND
The penalty provision of the 1870 Illinois ConstiCOMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 51 (1969).
tution declared: "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense."
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constitutions, a significant concern is whether the Illinois Constitution
may provide a higher standard of protection against cruel and unusual
punishment than its federal counterpart. Indeed, the provision concerning rehabilitation contained in the penalty protection of the Illinois
Constitution may arguably preclude the imposition of any death sentence, since the idea of rehabilitation is seemingly antithetical to the
idea of capital punishment.
On a constitutional level, it is quite possible that state protections
could be interpreted to be greater than federal. Those federally protected rights which have been held applicable to the states by virtue
of the fourteenth amendment are not an exhaustive compendium of
all the citizens' rights which a state may wish to protect.2 1 For example, the California Supreme Court, previous to the Furman decision, had held that imposition of the death penalty violated the California constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.
The disjunctive formulation of the prohibition in the California Constitution as opposed to its conjunctive formulation in the Federal Constitution was interpreted to prescribe a more extensive prohibition than
that prescribed by the Founding Fathers. 2 t ' In the same way, the
Illinois Supreme Court may give the penalty protection of the Illinois
Constitution a reach that surpasses the interpretation given the eighth
amendment by the United States Supreme Court.
The penalty protection was indeed a topic of discussion at the 1970
Illinois Constitutional Convention which was considered in the context
of the entire sentencing process. Animated debate among the delegates had arisen on the question of adding to the 1870 constitution's
penalty protection, which provided only -that penalties be "proportioned to the nature of the offense, '212 some provision articulating the
concept of rehabilitation as an objective of sentencing.21 3 There was
At the 1970 Constitutional Convention, this proviILL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (1870).
sion was changed somewhat. See text accompanying notes 212-16 infra.
210. While the Federal Constitution requires that just compensation be paid when
property is taken for public use, U.S. CONST. amend. V, held applicable to the states,

Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the Illinois Constitution re-

quires that such compensation be paid when property is taken or damaged for public

use. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1970). Likewise, the Illinois Constitution contains an
explicit prohibition against sex discrimination, ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1970), while
the Federal Constitution has none.
211. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 634, 493 P.2d 880, 883, 100 Cal. Rptr.
152, 155 (1972).

212.

ILL. CONST. art. H, § 11 (1870).

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION:
VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS 1391, 1391-96 (June 2, 1970). The addition, proposed by
Leonard N. Foster, would have changed Article I, § 11 of the Illinois Constitution
to read:
213.

All penalties shall be proportioned both to the nature of the offense and to
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concern among many of the delegates that adoption of this addition

to the penalty protection would in effect abolish capital punishment

in Illinois.2 14 However, during the debate, the drafter of the rehabilitation provision declared that incorporation of this addition into the
Illinois Constitution's penalty protection would not preclude capital
punishment as a legislatively prescribed penalty for certain crimes "if
the offense[s] were considered so overwhelmingly outrageous that the
General Assembly wanted to impose the death penalty."2'15 With this
assurance, the delegates voted to adopt the rehabilitation provision.2 1 6
Subsequently, there was debate on a proposed addition to the pen-

alty protection calling for explicit abolition of capital punishment.217
Many delegates favored abolition of capital punishment but felt that
the matter was one for a legislature, not for a constitutional convention, to pass on. 218 In the final vote, the proposal narrowly missed
adoption.2 19 Still unsatisfied, some delegates felt the matter to be of
sufficient importance to warrant its submission to the voters as a constitutional amendment, separate from adoption of the entire constitution. 220 This proposal carried. 2 21
the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship, and the basis of
such penalties shall be explained by the court and subject to review.
It is interesting to note that the convention was considering the idea of reviewability
of sentencing decisions even before Furman, and indeed was seeking to curb the arbitrary sentencing power of judges. Id. at 1391. Mr. Foster's suggestion that sentences
be reviewed was not adopted, however, because of the feeling that this was an area
of judicial discretion, id. at 1392, and that sentencing standards were a legislative prerogative. Id. at 1394.
214. Id. at 1391.
215. Id. at 1391 (June 2, 1970); 3636 (August 5, 1970).
216. Id. at 1396 (June 2, 1970).
217. Id. at 1414-26.
218. See, e.g., the remarks of Clifford L. Downen, id.at 1424-25 (June 2, 1970);
Dendell Durr, id. at 1425 (June 2, 1970); William L. Fay, id. at 1425 (June 2, 1970);
Ray H. Garrison, id. at 1425 (June 2, 1970); John L. Knuppel, id. at 1425 (June 2,
1970); Mary A. Pappas, id. at 1425 (June 2, 1970); Martin Ozinga, id. at 1425 (June
2, 1970). See the comments of the drafters of the Illinois Criminal Code in this regard: Subsection
(c) [of ch. 38, § 1-7, dealing with
capital offenses] reflects the
Committee's policy decision not to recommend the abolition of capital punishment in the Code. In view of the controversial and highly emotional aspects
of capital punishment the Committee felt that its total or partial abolition
should be considered on its own merits by the General Assembly and not in
the context of a new Criminal Code.
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE § 1-7, Committee Comments 34 (1961) (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 1426 (June 2, 1970). The final vote was 50 ayes, 54 nays, 1 pass,
and 1 present. For the member proposals to abolish capital punishment which failed
in the Bill of Rights Committee, see RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION:
COMMITTEE PROPOSALS [cont.]/MEMBER PROPOSALS (1970)
at 2937 (member proposal no. 222), 2964-65 (member proposal no. 277) and at 3012
(member proposal no. 387). For the majority proposal issuing from the Bill of Rights
Committee, see RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: COMMITTEE PROPOSALS 45 (1970).
220. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS 3649-51 (August 5, 1970).
221. Id. at 3651.
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On December 15, 1970, by popular referendum, the new Illinois
Constitution was adopted by the state's voters. More significantly, by
slightly less than a two-to-one margin, the state's voters in the same
referendum rejected the abolition of the death penalty.22 2 Thus,
many of the voters approved the new constitution's general provisions,
including the rehabilitation provision, but rejected any specific abolition of the death penalty.
In light of this constitutional history, it is difficult to find support
for the contention that the Illinois Constitution's rehabilitation provision renders the new Illinois death penalty statute constitutionally defective.2 2 3 The drafters of the new statute were well aware of the
possible conflict but, after consultation with a convention delegate, dismissed it.2 24 On balance, the overwhelming weight of authority indicates that the rehabilitation provision does not preclude imposition
of capital punishment, but it may require a finding by the new statute's
sentencing panel that the offender cannot be restored to useful citizenship. 225 To remove any possibility for constitutional doubt, it is suggested that the General Assembly consider submitting for public approval an amended version of the new constitution's penalty protection, providing:
All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness
of the offense and, excluding capital cases, with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship ....
Legislative Authority to Change the Illinois Courts
A more serious constitutional infirmity on the state level appears
222.

ILLINOIS

CONSTITUTION OF 1970 15 (Secretary of State 1971).

It is also sig-

nificant that the Constitution was adopted by a positive vote, and that abolition of
the death penalty required a positive vote. For the adoption of the constitution to
carry and the abolition of the death penalty to fail, it was necessary that a voter deliberately switch his vote from "yes" on the first question to "no" on the second question.
The voting result indicates the weakness of any contention that voters were not cognizant of, or failed to reflect upon, the issues presented in the referendum:
Total number of electors voting at the election:
2,017,717
Do you approve the proposed 1970 Constitution?:
Yes ----------1,122,425
N o -......-.-.---.------------------------------.----.-.---------------------...--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 838,168

[Do you approve] [a]bolishing the death penalty?:
Y es
No

-- .- .

....

..-.-.

. . .. . . . . . . . .
. ...
. 676,302
--.-.------.-.--------....
. .......
. .....
.1,2 18,79 1

Id. at 15.
223. Governor Walker was one who felt that it was difficult reconciling the new
Illinois death penalty statute with the Illinois Constitution's rehabilitation provision.
Letter from Governor Daniel Walker to the Members of the Illinois House of Representatives, September 12, 1973.
224. Letter from Roger C. Nauert, Chief Counsel, Illinois Legislative Investigating
Commission, to Rep. Joseph Sevcik (R.-Berwyn), December 5, 1972.
225. Reinstatement of the Death Penalty, Report of the Illinois Legislative Council
7 (File 8-136) (1972).
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in the statute's establishment of a three-judge panel for imposition of
the death sentence in cases of capital offense murder. The legislature
may lack the constitutional authority to change the composition of
the Illinois courts, and if it lacks the authority to change the courts,
then a priori it lacks the authority to establish a circuit court consisting of more than one judge.2 2
In this regard the 1970 Illinois Constitution makes specific provision
for the number of judges on the Illinois Supreme Court 27 and the
number of judges in each appellate district, 228 but, by contrast, it
makes no provision for a circuit court of more than one judge.2 29 Historically, under the 1870 Illinois Constitution, one-judge circuit courts
were the courts of general jurisdiction, 23 0 and the Illinois Supreme
Court, in regulating their operation, had declared that it was error for
more than one judge to participate in the proceedings of a given
case.

23 1

In 1962 there was an attempt to provide the legislature with the
constitutional power to create a three-judge circuit court for important
cases of unusual public interest. The proposal aimed at engrafting
such a provision onto the 1962 Judicial Amendment to the 1870 constitution, which amendment became the basis for the judicial section
in the 1970 constitution. This proposal was rejected, and was not
resubmitted at the time the new constitution was drafted. 2 Accordingly, the absence of such a provision in the new constitution and
the historical pre-eminence of one-judge circuit courts under the old
constitution are strong indications that the three-judge panel established by the new Illinois death penalty statute is the product of an
unconstitutional enactment on the part of the legislature.
This view is well supported by authority, for it was held under the
226. Fins, Is The 1973 Death Penalty Valid Under The 1970 Illinois Constitution?,
55 CHIcAGo BAR RECORD 186, 187 (1974).
227. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1970).
228. Id. § 5.
229. Fins, Is the 1973 Death Penalty Valid Under The 1970 Illinois Constitution?,

55

CMCAGO

BAR

RECORD

186, 187 (1974).

230. Id.
231. Wayland v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 43, 47, 15 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1938); Harvey v. Van DeMark, 71 Il. 117, 120 (1873).
232. Fins, Is The 1973 Death Penalty Valid Under The 1970 Illinois Constitution?,
55 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 186, 186-87 (1974). Constitutionally, the judiciary derives
its powers from Article VI of the Illinois Constitution:
The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and
Circuit Courts.
ILL.

CONsr. art. VI, § 1 (1970).

The legislature derives its powers from Article IV:

The legislative power is vested in a General Assembly consisting of a Sen-

ate and a House of Representatives elected by the electors from 59 Legislative Districts.
ILL. CONST. art.
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1870 constitution that the General Assembly could enact laws regulating judicial practice only where such laws did not impinge on the inherent powers of the judiciary. 28 3 Thus, an act regulating the power
of the courts to render a judgment of dismissal was invalidated. 23 4 In
People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, the Illinois Supreme Court struck
down a statutory provision regarding bail pending appeal because the
scope of the provision exceeded the legislative authority granted to
2 35
the General Assembly.
Moreover, the Illinois Constitution and the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules may render the new statute's appellate provisions invalid. Under the new statute, appeal from a death sentence imposed by the
trial court may be taken to an appropriate Illinois appellate court. 236
By contrast, under the Illinois Constitution 2 7 and the Illinois Supreme
Court Rules, 238 appeal from a death sentence imposed by a lower Illinois court is to be taken directly to the Illinois Supreme Court without the need to pursue any remedy on the appellate level. Further,
as a general principle, those rules promulgated by the Illinois Supreme
Court on the subject of appeals are expressly ordained as superseding
any statutory provision inconsistent with such rules and as governing
all appeals.23 9 In view of this procedural conflict between the new
statute on the one hand and the Illinois Constitution and the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules on the other hand, it seems unquestionable that
the Illinois Supreme Court's power to review death sentences preempts the field of appellate review in capital cases by virtue of appellate primacy.
233. Agran v. Checker Taxi Company, 412 Ill. 145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715
(1952).
234. Id. at 150-51, 105 N.E.2d at 715-16. Apparently, the only area in which there
is a precedent for legislative regulation of the judiciary is that concerning rules of evidence. The legislature may prescribe rules concerning admissibility of evidence. People v. Wells, 380 Ill. 347, 354, 44 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1942).
However, such rules must
be consistent with reason and human experience.
Shoot v. Illinois Liquor Control
Commission, 30 11. 2d 570, 576, 198 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1964). In only two other
instances has the judiciary consented to legislative regulation. Honore v. Home National Bank, 80 Ill. 489, 492 (1875) (law requiring that an affidavit of merits be filed
with defendant's plea in certain classes of suits at law upheld); Arnold & Murdock
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 314 Il. 251, 254-55, 145 N.E. 342, 343 (1924) (law

restricting judgments in workmen's compensation actions upheld as to future actions,
but not as to actions which had already issued in a judgment, since judgments were
vested rights).
235. 40 Ill. 2d 62, 65-66, 237 N.E.2d 495, 497-98 (1968).
236. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-lA (1973).

237. "Appeals from judgments of Circuit Courts imposing a sentence of death shall
be directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for direct appeal in other cases." ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b) (1970).
238. "In cases in which a death sentence is imposed, an appeal is automatically
perfected without any action by the defendant or his counsel.... ".ILL. Sup. Cr.
RULE 606(a).
239. "The rules on appeals supersede statutory provisions inconsistent with the rules
and govern all appeals." ILL. SuP. Or. RULE 1.
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Accordingly, it is clear that the new Illinois death penalty statute
does not comport with legal precedent, the Illinois Constitution, and
the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. To rectify this situation, the General Assembly, at the very least, should (1) repeal the provision creating the three-judge panel as such, without abandoning the idea of a
special sentencing hearing; (2) designate the trial judge as the sentencing judge, barring a case of incapacity; (3) explicitly limit the
conduct of the special sentencing hearing to one judge; and (4) clarify the appellate procedure as a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court. Another option for the General Assembly is to submit the
proposal for a three-judge sentencing panel and appellate court review
in capital cases to the Illinois Supreme Court for consideration and
possible adoption into the Illinois Supreme Court Rules.
CONCLUSION

The new Illinois death penalty statute faces a constitutional Armageddon. There are serious constitutional questions to be resolved on
both the federal level and on the state level. Since the Furman decision was shrouded with such uncertainty, some legislative groping for
the constitutional answers is to be expected. Hopefully, much of the
haze surrounding the issue of capital punishment in the United States
will be removed when the United States Supreme Court grapples with
post-Furmandeath penalty statutes.
There are the self-styled Cassandras who predict that the Court is
moving inexorably toward the abolition of capital punishment,2 4 ° and
there are those who see Furman as merely a step in the direction
of increased rationality in the criminal justice system-an episode in
the context of the due process "revolution." 2 4 ' Undoubtedly, the
great uncertainty associated with Furman is rooted in the even greater
uncertainty concerning capital punishment itself. For every study
lending support to the concept of capital punishment, there is another
study arguing for its abolition. Public opinion is equally divided.
In the search for a rational answer, however, it is perhaps irrational
to throw the burdens of the search onto the judiciary. The capital
punishment debate is a factual dialectic, not a legal one. 242 Accordingly, an exhaustive determination of capital punishment's efficacy can
240. Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WASH. L. REV.
95, 109 (1972).
241. Wollan, The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 LOYOLA Cm. L.J. 339, 352 &
n.40 (1973).
242. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 403-05 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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only be made by the legislature, which, unlike the judiciary, has been
endowed with the attributes of flexibility and public responsiveness.
There is no binding precedent in the legislature.
The new Illinois statute is one legislature's resolution of the issue.
Other legislatures in states which were abolitionist before Furman
have chosen not to reinstate capital punishment. In any case, if capital punishment is to be reinstated, retained, or abolished, the impetus
should come from popular sentiment, and not from the judiciary. As
24 3
Chief Justice Burger declared in his Furman opinion:
The highest judicial duty is to recognize the limits on judicial
power and to permit the democratic processes to deal with matters
falling outside of those limits.
MITCHELL E. GARNER

243.

Id. at 405.
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